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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether trial court has discretion to deny motion to compel discovery where
trial court determined discovery requests are vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
Standard of review: Trial court's denial of the motion to compel is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. See Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, Tjl6, 30 P.3d 436 (citing
Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229, ^5, 984 P.2d 404.)
Issue 2: Whether Trial Court has discretion to deny request to extend discovery
deadlines where party had unduly delayed the matter.
Standard of Review: "Because trial courts have broad discretion in matters of
discovery, this issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Consequently, 'an appellate court
will not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no
evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.'" Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 1J39, 29 P.3d
638 (quoting Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996).
Issue 3: Whether Trial Court abused its discretion by determining prevailing party.
Standard of review: This Court reviews "the trial court's determination as to who
was the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion standard." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook,

IV

2002UT 11,U25,40 P.3d 1119.
Issue 4: Whether Trial Court abused its discretion when it determined attorney
fees were reasonable and not excessive.
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the reasonableness of an attorney's fee
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317
(Utah 1998).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this Case, Plaintiff John F. Stout doing business as Pioneer Roofing (hereinafter
"Pioneer Roofing") contracted with Defendant Creekside East Homeowners Association
(hereinafter "Creekside") to install a roof on Creekside's condominiums. After Pioneer
Roofing completed the roofing project, Creekside refused to pay Pioneer Roofing. As a
consequence, Pioneer Roofing filed suit against Creekside alleging breach of contract and
unjust enrichment. Creekside counterclaimed against Pioneer Roofing by alleging breach of
contract and negligent employment. Creekside did not complete its discovery in a timely
manner. The Trial Court therefore denied Creekside's Request to Extend Discovery
Deadlines because Creekside had unduly delayed the matter.
At trial, the Jury awarded Pioneer Roofing the principal amount of $31,865.00 and
offset the principal amount by awarding Creekside $4,200.00. Judgment was entered
thereafter and Pioneer Roofing, pursuant to the contract, was awarded its attorney fees as the
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prevailing party. Creekside has appealed the Trial Court's discovery rulings and its attorney
fee award.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about February 10,2000, Pioneer Roofing contracted with Creekside to

install a roof on Creekside's condominiums. [R. 7]
2.

After the roofing proj ect was completed, Pioneer Roofing invoiced Creekside

for the amount due and owing in the amount of $30,906.00, which included changes to the
contract. [R. 8]
3.

On or about April 19, 2002, Pioneer Roofing filed suit alleging breach of

contract and unjust enrichment. [R. 1-4]
4.

On or about April 30, 2002, Creekside answered the complaint and

counterclaimed against Pioneer Roofing alleging breach of contract and negligent
employment. [R. 14-17]
5.

On or about May 24,2002, the parties held an Attorneys' Planning Meeting in

which Creekside's attorney stated he knew just how long it takes to complete discovery and
would not agree to the 240 day discovery cutoff as set forth by rule and demanded a
discovery cutoff date of January 30,2003, which is 275 days after Creeksidefiledits answer.
Pioneer Roofing's counsel agreed to the January 30, 2003, cutoff date as demanded by
Creekside's attorney. [R. 30; R 318-22]
6.

On or about July 9, 2002, Pioneer Roofing served discovery requests on

Creekside. [R. 33-34]
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7.

On August 19,2002, Creekside filed a Motion to Recuse Judge Lindberg. [R.

8.

In September, 2002, Pioneer Roofing made an offer to Creekside to settle the

37-57]

matter. Creekside did not respond to the offer settlement until December 27,2002. [R. 320]
9.

On December 6, 2002, Pioneer Roofing submitted a Notice to Submit for the

Motion to Recuse Judge Lindberg. [R. 74-76]
10.

On or about January 10,2003, the Trial Court, through its associate presiding

judge, denied Creekside's motion to recuse Judge Lindberg by determining that Creekside's
motion to recuse was untimely, not within the scope of the rules, and unsupported by any
analysis or authority. [R. 79-81]
11.

On or about January 24,2003, Pioneer Roofing served responses to Creekside's

discovery requests. [R. 84]
12.

On February 5,2003, Creekside filed a motion to compel discovery requests.

[R. 108-09]
13.

On February 20, 2003, Pioneer Roofing filed a motion to strike Creekside's

motion to compel discovery and filed a motion for protective order. [R. 110-44]
14.

On or about March 31, 2003, the Trial Court denied Creekside's motion to

compel and granted Pioneer Roofing's motion for protective order by determining
Creekside's discovery requests were vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. [R. 160-65]
15.

On or about April 25, 2003, Creekside filed a Request to Extend Discovery

Deadlines. [R. 166-67]
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16.

On May 5,2003, Pioneer Roofing filed a certificate of readiness for trial. [R.

223-24]
17.

On May 7, 2003, Creekside filed a second motion to recuse Judge Lindberg.

[R. 227-288]
18.

On or about May 7,2003, Creekside filed another Request to Extend Discovery

Deadlines. [R. 290-91]
19.

On July 7, 2003, Judge Lindberg recused herself by determining as follows:
the Court has been concerned with the delays that Plaintiff has
already experienced as a result of Defendant's motion to
recuse. It is unfair to Plaintiff to have the resolution of his
case held hostage until these collateral matters are addressed.
After weighing this Court's duty to retain a case, versus its
duty to expedite resolution of matters before it and to preserve
the integrity and independence of the judiciary, the Court
concludes that the better course is to recuse itself from this
case and allow Plaintiffs case to proceed to resolution in
another court.

[R. 305]
20.

On August 28,2003, the Trial Court, shortly after the case had been transferred

to the Honorable Timothy Hanson, held a telephone conference and ordered Pioneer Roofing
to file a response to Creekside's requests to extend discovery deadlines. [R. 315-17]
21.

On September 11, 2003, Pioneer Roofing filed an opposition to Creekside's

request to extend discovery deadlines. [R. 318-22]
22.

On or about October 6, 2003, the Trial Court denied Creekside's request to

extend discovery deadlines by determining as follows:
The defendant seeks to extend the January 30,200[3], discovery
deadline on the basis that discovery has been delayed by
5

settlement negotiations, the filing of recusal requests and the
filing of a Motion to Compel. Of these, only the pendency of a
motion to compel could have potentially hindered the discovery
from progressing. However, while the Motion to Compel was
decided on March 31, 2003, the defendant (for unknown
reasons) has taken no further steps to complete its discovery in
the months following. Furthermore, as plaintiff accurately
describes in his opposition, this case has already been unduly
delayed and the defendant has not articulated an adequate basis
to delay it further. Accordingly, having considered the
defendant's Request, the Court denies the same.
[R. 325-26]
23.

On December 9, 10, and 11, a Jury Trial was held in this matter and the Jury

returned a general verdict in favor of Pioneer Roofing in the amount of $31,865.00 and
returned a general verdict in favor of Creekside in the amount of $4,200.00. [R. 610-11]
24.

On January 12,2004, Pioneer Roofing filed an Affidavit of Attorney Fees. [R.

615-25]
25.

On February 2, 2004, Creekside filed a response to affidavit of attorney fees.

[R. 644-55]
26.

On April 5,2004, the Trial Court determined that "the attorney fees and costs

sought by the plaintiff are reasonable and therefore declines to reduce the amounts sought by
almost 50% amount suggested by the defendant." [R. 722-25]
27.

On April 23, 2004, Creekside filed a motion for a new trial, or in the

alternative, for additur or remmitur. [R. 727-28]
28.

On May 4, 2004, Pioneer Roofing filed an opposition to the motion for new

trial, or in the alternative, for additur or remmitur. [R. 757-68]
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29.

On June 6,2004, the Trial Court entered Judgment in favor of Pioneer Roofing

and against Creekside. [R. 777-79]
30.

On July 14,2004, the Trial Court entered an Order Regarding Motion for New

Trial, Additur, and Remmitur by determining as follows:
There is no legal basis upon which the Court may consider
granting a new trial or an additur or a remittitur. The Court
declines to consider the affidavits submitted by Defendant
because the affidavits are hearsay and if otherwise admissible,
the thought process of the jury, absent a showing of resort to
chance or bribery, is an improper intrusion upon the jury
deliberation process. This Court therefore denies Defendant's
Motion.
[R. 784-86]
31.

On July 19, 2004, Creekside filed its notice of appeal. [R. 787-88]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Creekside's motion to
compel because the trial court determined that Creekside's discovery requests were vague,
ambiguous, and overbroad. Creekside failed to limit its discovery requests by time and place.
Creekside also sought information regarding "concerns," "problems," and "disputes," but
failed to define what it meant by those terms or how those issues related to the roofing
project at issue in this matter. Trial court's are granted broad discretion with regard to
motions to compel because trial courts are in a better position than appellate courts to make
the determination to deny or grant a motion to compel.
This Court should determine that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Creekside's request to extend discovery deadlines. Trial courts have broad discretion
7

in matters of discovery, and therefore an appellate court will not find abuse of discretion
absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial
court's ruling. In this matter the Trial Court had ample evidence before it to support its
determination that Creekside had unduly delayed this matter. Creekside refused to complete
discovery in the 240 days required by the rules of civil procedure. Creekside also failed to
conduct its discovery in a timely manner. When its time had run, it filed two motions to
extend the discovery deadlines, but failed to submit either of the motions to the Trial Court
for decision. Creekside also filed two motions to recuse Judge Lindberg, which also unduly
delayed the matter. As a result, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Creekside's motions to extend discovery.
Pioneer Roofing sued Creekside for $25,906.00, plus a 10% penalty, and interest, and
the Jury awarded Creekside $31,865.00. Creekside brought a counterclaim for breach of
contract and negligent employment. The jury entered a verdict for Creekside in the amount
of $4,200.00. Pioneer Roofing was the prevailing party in this matter and was duly awarded
its attorney fees, pursuant to the contract, as the prevailing party. This Court reviews a trial
court's determination as to who is the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion standard.
In this matter, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Pioneer
Roofing was the prevailing party because Creekside only obtained a nominal amount on its
counterclaims.
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Pioneer Roofing's
attorney fees were reasonable and not excessive. This Court reviews a trial court's
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determination of the amount of a reasonable attorney fee through an abuse of discretion
standard because the trial court is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the
quality and efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the litigation. The Trial
Court reviewed the Affidavit of Costs and Attorney Fees, which included a detailed
description of Pioneer Roofing's attorney fees and determined that the attorney fees were
reasonable and not excessive. Creekside failed to marshal the evidence in support of the
Trial Court's findings. This Court should therefore not disturb the Trial Court's findings.
The Trial Court determined that Pioneer Roofing is the prevailing party in this matter
and, pursuant to the contract between the parties, awarded attorney fees to Pioneer Roofing.
Pioneer Roofing is the prevailing party on appeal. This Court should therefore remand this
matter to the Trial Court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney fees incurred by
Pioneer Roofing on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED CREEKSIDE'S
MOTION TO COMPEL BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT DETERMINED THAT CREEKSIDE'S
DISCOVERY REQUESTS WERE VAGUE,
AMBIGUOUS, AND OVERBROAD

Creekside argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion when it denied
Creekside's motion to compel. Creekside's appellate brief provides this Court with
exhaustive commentary and opinion, but has provided scant citation to the record and
relatively little legal analysis or legal authority to support its claim that the Trial Court
abused its discretion when it denied Creekside's motion to compel. This Court should
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therefore decline to address Creekside's argument. See SLW/Utah, MacKay v. Hardy,
973 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1998) ("[W]e will not address issues not adequately briefed.");
State v. Wareham, 111 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address issue where "brief
wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support... argument"); State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988) ("'[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" (quoting Williamson v.
Opsdhl, 92 111. App.3d 1087, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981))).
If this Court does address Creekside's argument, this Court reviews "the trial
court's denial of the motion to compel under an abuse of discretion standard." Pack v.
Case, 2001 UT App 232, ^16 30 P.3d 436 (citing Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229,
^|55 984 P.2d 404.)
In Pack, the defendant
assertfed] that the trial court abused its discretion when it
refused to compel Pack to respond to interrogatories asking
for (1) the names of the two dry wall workers and repair
people with knowledge about alleged repairs and defects; (2)
the names of all the people who worked on the house; and (3)
the blueprints for the house.
Id. at ^[29. In Pack, this Court determined as follows:
We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied Case's motion to compel. First, the record
indicates that the repairs of both the interior and the roof were
conducted by Pack, his son, and an employee of Pack. Prior
to trial, Case was able to depose both Pack and his son and
thereby ascertain the names of any workers who may have
helped with the repairs. However, Case filed his motion to
compel before he deposed Pack and Pack's son. On the facts
10

of this case, regardless of whether the trial court exceeded its
discretion by denying the motion to compel brought at such an
early stage of discovery, Case could have renewed his motion
to compel if he was unable to obtain the desired information
through other discovery.
Second, it was well within the trial court's discretion to deny
Case's motion to compel Pack to provide the names of all the
persons who participated in the construction of Pack's house.
Such a request is overly broad and unduly burdensome
because many workers participated in the construction of the
house. Moreover, the majority of the workers involved in the
construction of the house would not have set foot upon the
roof of the house and would not have had any knowledge of
the work conducted upon the roof. Therefore, these
employees could not provide information relevant to the
present case. Further, there is nothing in the record indicating
Case had anything other than unlimited access to the roof or
that the defects were there to be seen.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
refused to compel Pack to produce the blueprints for the
house because Case could have obtained the blueprints from
Salt Lake City. Indeed, Case eventually did obtain the
blueprints from Salt Lake City. Thus, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied Case's motion to compel.
Id. at ffl|30-32. The Trial Court in this matter did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Creekside's motion to compel because Creekside's discovery requests, as determined by
the Trial Court, were "vague, ambiguous, and overbroad." [R. 162]
For example, Creekside's Interrogatory 2 seeks the following information:
Provide the last known names and numbers of any business
entities, governmental agencies, persons who have ever had
any complaints, concerns, lawsuits, disputes, problems, issues
regarding any of the supplies, workmanship, or services
provided by Plaintiff or its agents to any persons or businesses
or other legal entities.
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[R. 99] Pioneer Roofing has been in business for over twenty years. Interrogatory 2
does not limit its interrogatory by time and thus Pioneer Roofing would have to provide
the requested information accumulated over a twenty year period. The interrogatory is
vague and ambiguous because it does not define "concern," "disputes," or "problems." If
one of Pioneer Roofing's customers called Pioneer Roofing and said he was "concerned"
about the weather because it might rain while Pioneer Roofing worked on his roof,
Pioneer Roofing would have to disclose that information to Creekside. Obviously that
hypothetical "concern" is not relevant to the issues of this case, but Pioneer Roofing
would have to provide all such irrelevant information to Creekside to respond to
Interrogatory 2.
Furthermore, the information sought in Interrogatory 2 does not seek, as asserted
by Creekside, information regarding "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Utah R. Evid. Rule 404(b).
Interrogatory 2 only seeks information regarding character and witness credibility.
Creekside relies on State v. Lanier, 11% P.2d 9 (Utah 1989) to support its claim that
"witness's credibility is always a relevant issue of inquiry in discovery." Brief of the
Appellant, p. 13. Lanier, however, does not even mention discovery. "The sole issue [in
Lanier] is whether it is harmless error to permit the admission of evidence of defendant's
previous convictions for burglary and robbery pursuant to rule 609, Utah Rules of
Evidence." Lanier, 778 P.2d at 9. Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence refers to
impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime, and thus Rule 609 has nothing to do
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with the issues in this case. Creekside's reliance on Lanier is therefore misplaced. The
Trial Court therefore correctly determined interrogatory 2, "as presently structured, is
vague and overbroad. It is possible, however, that Defendant may be able to narrow and
define this discovery request by using time limits and language that limits the information
requested to that reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence under Utah Rules of
Evidence 404 (b)." [R. 162]
In Interrogatory 3, Creekside seeks the following information:
Provide the party names, the name of the court and docket
numbers of lawsuits or administrative actions filed against
Plaintiff or its agents because of any of its business practices or
because of its services, materials or workmanship.
[R. 100] Similar to Interrogatory 2, Interrogatory 3 is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad
because it is not limited in time or place. It also requests information regarding Pioneer
Roofing's agents, yet Creekside does not define agent. An agent of Pioneer Roofing
would likely include an employee, which, to respond to the interrogatory, Pioneer
Roofing would have to provide information about its employees accumulated over a
twenty plus year period. Creekside seeks information that is also unduly burdensome, and
oppressive, as well as vague, and overbroad. Thus, the Trial Court correctly determined
"that this interrogatory is vague and overbroad. Arguably, this particular request could be
narrowed by providing reasonable time limits to the request and limiting the request to
causes of action that relate to the claims Defendant has made against Plaintiff." [R. 162]
In Interrogatories 4 and 5, Creekside seeks irrelevant and/or inadmissible
information. Defendant's Interrogatory 4 seeks the following information: "Has Plaintiff
13

or its agents ever been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving dishonesty?"
[R. 100] Interrogatory 5 seeks specific information if Interrogatory 4 is answered in the
affirmative. [R. 100] The information sought by Creekside is not limited to "agents" that
worked on the condominium roof at issue in this matter, but seeks information regarding
any and all agents of Pioneer Roofing over a twenty year period. Creekside does not
define agent and does not limit the discovery to whether the felony or misdemeanor
involves a dishonest act while the agent was in the employ of Pioneer Roofing.
Furthermore, Pioneer Roofing's honesty is not at issue. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action." (Emphasis added.) Thus, Creekside is not entitled to discovery regarding
Pioneer Roofing's honesty unless Pioneer Roofing's honesty is at issue in this pending
matter. Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." Creekside has not attacked
Pioneer Roofing's character for truthfulness. Creekside's causes of action are for breach
of contract and negligent employment, not, for example, fraud or misrepresentation.
Thus, interrogatories 4 and 5 are overbroad, vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome, and
outside the scope of discovery. The Trial Court determined that "the discovery request is
not limited to those who may be called as witnesses, but appears to apply to any employee
of Plaintiff. See Utah R. Evid. 609. Upon identification of those persons who are likely
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to appear as witnesses at trial, Defendant might be able to provide a narrower
construction of this discovery request." [R. 163]
In Interrogatory 6, Creekside seeks the following discovery: "Do you claim that
Defendant or its agents made any representations that were incorrect?" [R. 100]
Creekside seeks a yes or no answer to Interrogatory 6, but the interrogatory is vague,
ambiguous, and overbroad and cannot simply be answered with a yes or no. Creekside
does not define agent, does not limit the scope of the interrogatory to time and place, and
does not define what it means by "any representations." Pioneer Roofing has brought no
cause of action against Creekside regarding its honesty, but Creekside seems to be
seeking information from Pioneer Roofing regarding Creekside's honesty.
Interrogatory 7 seeks discovery if Interrogatory 6 is answered in the affirmative:
If your answer to the preceding interrogatory was "yes,"
please provide the following information for each and every
representation that you claim to be incorrect:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Describe the representation that was made;
State the name of the individual making the
representation and the date the representation occurred.
Identify all witnesses to the alleged representation;
Explain why you believe the representation is
inaccurate;
Fully describe how you have been damaged, if at all,
by the alleged misrepresentation;
Identify each and every document, letter,
memorandum, recording, or other item evidencing the
alleged representation and provide the name, address
and telephone number of each person possessing the
item.

[R. 86] Pioneer Roofing is suing Creekside for breach of contract and unjust enrichment,
but Creekside somehow believes that Pioneer Roofing has alleged misrepresentation.
Misrepresentation is not at issue in the pending matter. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)
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("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action."). Furthermore, Creekside seeks
discovery that is overbroad, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome because it has provided
no definition, scope, or time period.
Creekside states that Interrogatories 6 and 7 seek to "determine whether or not
plaintiffs claims [sic] that the defendant ever made any misrepresentations to it that
affected plaintiffs ability to properly accomplish the work it had been contracted to
perform." [R. 90] Pioneer Roofing has not made a claim for misrepresentation against
Creekside. Thus, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
u

[t]hese discovery requests are also vague, overbroad, and ambiguous. Plaintiff has no

way of knowing what 'any representations' are. Furthermore, particular representations
or misrepresentations do not appear to be an issue in this case." [R. 163]
With regard to Requests for Production of Documents, Creekside's Request No. 6
seeks the following discovery documents:
Please produce a copy of each of the personnel files, wage
statements, contracts of all persons that were either employees
or independent contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied
services or materials to Defendant.
[R. 105] The Trial Court determined that "Defendant asserts, without support, that this
information is necessary for it to maintain its counterclaims. While some of these
documents arguably may be relevant, as it is currently drafted, the request is overbroad."
[R. 163]
Request No. 12 seeks the following discovery:
Please produce a copy of each and every document, recording,
photograph, or other item evidencing any complaints,
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concerns, lawsuits, disputes, problems, issues regarding any
of the supplies, workmanship, or services provided by
Plaintiff or its agents to any persons or businesses or other
legal entities.
[R. 106] The Trial Court determined that "[tjhis request appears to be substantively
related to Interrogatory No. 2. As the Court has already concluded with respect to the
prior request, this request is also vague. Plaintiff has no way of knowing every person or
entity that has ever had a 'concern' or 'problem' against it. Additionally, the scope of this
discovery request appears to encompass situations not related to Defendant's claims for
negligent employment or material breach of contract." [R. 163] The Trial Court,
therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it determined the requests are vague.
In State ex rel Rd. Comm 'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (1966), the
Utah Supreme Court determined as follows:
The use of discovery should not be extended to permit
ferreting unduly into detail, nor to have the effect of crossexamining the opposing party or his witnesses. Nor should it
be distorted into a "fishing expedition" in the hope that
something may be uncovered. It should be confined within
the proper limits of enabling the parties to find out essential
facts for its legitimate objective hereinabove stated.
Id. at 386. Creekside's interrogatories and requests run far afield of the essential facts of the
pending action. In essence, Creekside discovery requests amount to a fishing expedition in
hopes of turning up something relevant. The typical fishing expedition consists of a
fisherman casting a line into water in hopes of catching a fish. Creekside, however, instead
of casting a single line, admits that it wants to cast a net in its fishing expedition. See Brief
of the Appellant, p. 18 ("The Defendant's discovery net was thrown to do just that, entrap or
'encompass' evidence that may be relevant.") In this case, the Trial Court did not abuse its
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discretion when it denied Creekside's motion to compel because the Trial Court determined
Creekside's discovery requests were vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. This Court should
therefore determine that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Creekside's motion to compel.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED CREEKSIDE'S
REQUEST TO EXTEND DISCOVERY
DEADLINES BECAUSE CREEKSIDE HAD
UNDULY DELAYED THIS MATTER

Creekside asserts that the Trial Court abused its discretion when it denied its
request to extend discovery. This Court should decline to address Creekside's argument
because Creekside has failed to support its claim with legal analysis or authority. See
SLW/Utah, 973 P.2d at 948 ("[W]e will not address issues not adequately briefed.").
In the event this Court does address Creekside's argument, this Court should
determine that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Creekside's
request to extend discovery deadlines. "Because trial courts have broad discretion in
matters of discovery, this issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Consequently, 'an
appellate court will not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or
where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.'" Green v. Louder, 2001 UT
62,1J39, 29 P.3d 638 (quoting Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996)).
In this case, the Trial Court determined that Creekside had unduly delayed the case
and had "not articulated an adequate basis for to delay it further." [R. 326] There is
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ample evidence in this case to support the Trial Court's ruling. Rule 26 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that "fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after
the first answer is filed." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d). Creekside, however, refused to agree to
the 240 days set forth in Rule 26(d). [R. 319] On or about May 24, 2002, Pioneer
Roofing's attorney and Creekside's attorney held an attorneys' planning meeting as
required by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 26(f).
At the attorneys' planning meeting, Creekside's counsel refused to allow discovery to
proceed as set forth in Rule 26(d), which provides that fact discovery will be completed
within 240 days after the first answer is filed. [R. 319] Creekside's attorney stated he
knew just how long it takes to complete discovery and would only agree to a discovery
cutoff date of January 30, 2002, which is 275 days after Creekside filed its answer. [R.
319] Pioneer Roofing's counsel agreed to the January 30, 2002, cutoff date as requested
by Creekside's attorney. [R. 30] As a consequence, Creekside already had obtained a
stipulated extension to the discovery deadlines when it requested another extension.
Creekside claims it needed more time to conduct discovery because the parties attempted
to settle this matter between September and December, 2002. Pioneer Roofing did make
an offer to settle the matter to which Creekside did not respond to until December 27,
2002. [R. 320] Settlement was not a matter of negotiating back and forth as typically
occurs in litigation. Pioneer Roofing made the offer to settle and Creekside simply
refused to respond to the settlement offer until December 27, 2002. [R. 320] In other
words, Creekside is solely responsible for its undue delay in responding to the settlement
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offer. During the settlement period, Creekside failed to conduct any discovery.1
Creekside also unduly delayed the matter by filing two motions to recuse Judge
Lindberg. Creekside filed the first motion to recuse on August 9, 2002, four months after
the filing of the Complaint. [R. 37-57] Pioneer Roofing timely filed a Motion to Strike
Defendant's Motion Requesting Judge Lindberg to Recuse Herself. [R. 69-71]
Creekside, however, failed to oppose the Motion to Strike. Furthermore, Creekside failed
to file a notice to submit for its recusal motion. Pioneer Roofing filed the notice to
submit in December, 2002. [R. 74-76] The Trial Court, through its associate presiding
judge, denied Creekside's motion to recuse by determining that Creekside's motion to
recuse was untimely, not within the scope of the rules, and unsupported by any analysis or
authority. [R 79-81]
In spite of the motion being denied, Creekside filed a second motion to recuse
Judge Lindberg. [R. 227-288] Creekside claims it was victorious in its efforts to have
Judge Lindberg recuse herself. Judge Lindberg, however, explained that she recused
herself because
the Court has been concerned with the delays that Plaintiff has
already experienced as a result of Defendant's motion to
recuse. It is unfair to Plaintiff to have the resolution of his
case held hostage until these collateral matters are addressed.
After weighing this Court's duty to retain a case, versus its
duty to expedite resolution of matters before it and to preserve
the integrity and independence of the judiciary, the Court
1

Creekside opines that Pioneer Roofing waited four months to respond to Creekside's discovery. See Brief of the
Appellant, p. 24. Creekside, however, admits that it was Creekside that caused the four month delay, not Pioneer
Roofing, because Creekside stated "it is reasonable that both parties would not want to expend more attorney's fees
while there was a possibility of a settlement. Hence while Defendant's counsel waited to hear back from the
Defendant condominium association on the settlement negotiations, Defendant's counsel tried to resolve the
discovery dispute (TR 699) and in December 200[2], when settlement did not occur, he requested that Plaintiff
respond to its discovery." See Brief of the Appellant, p. 25
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concludes that the better course is to recuse itself from this
case and allow Plaintiffs case to proceed to resolution in
another court.
[R. 305] Thus, the Trial Court recused itself because it recognized that Creekside had
unduly delayed this matter and would likely continue to do so unless she recused herself.
Although fact discovery was cutoff on January 30, 2003, Pioneer Roofing did not
file the certificate of readiness for trial until May 5, 2003; an additional 89 days after the
discovery cutoff. [R. 223-24] In the interim, on April 25, 2003, Creekside filed a
Request for Extension of Discovery Deadlines. [R. 166-67] On May 7, 2003, Creekside
filed another Request for Extension of Discovery Deadlines. [R. 290-91] Creekside,
however, never filed a notice to submit, as required by the rules of civil procedure, for
either of its Requests for Extension of Discovery Deadlines. Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4501(D) (2002) ("If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision."). As a result, the Trial Court did not rule on the unsubmitted motions.
Furthermore, the Trial Court in its ruling regarding the protective order suggested that
Creekside could redraft its discovery requests so that they would not be vague and
overbroad. [R. 160-65] Creekside, however, never redrafted the discovery requests.
On August 28, 2003, the newly appointed Trial Court, sua sponte, gave Pioneer
Roofing ten days to respond to the requests to extend discovery. [R. 315] On October 6,
2003, the Trial Court determined as follows:
The defendant seeks to extend the January 30, 200[3],
discovery deadline on the basis that discovery has been
delayed by settlement negotiations, the filing of recusal
requests and the filing of a Motion to Compel. Of these, only
the pendency of a motion to compel could have potentially
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hindered the discovery from progressing. However, while the
Motion to Compel was decided on March 31, 2003, the
defendant (for unknown reasons) has taken no further steps to
complete its discovery in the months following. Furthermore,
as plaintiff accurately describes in his opposition, this case
has already been unduly delayed and the defendant has not
articulated an adequate basis to delay it further. Accordingly,
having considered the defendant's Request, the Court denies
the same.
[R. 325-26] "Because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery
process, they are given broad discretion regarding the imposition of discovery sanctions."
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452,457 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Utah Supreme Court has
"long held that we will not interfere unless 'abuse of that discretion [is] clearly shown.'"
UtahDep'tofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d4,8, (Utah 1995) (quotingKatz v. Pierce, 732
P.2d 92,93 (Utah 1986)); see also Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410,412,16 Utah
2d 97,100 (1964) ("Unless it is shown that [the trial court's] action is without support in the
record, or is a plain abuse of discretion, it should not be disturbed."). In this case, the record
clearly supports the Trial Court's determination to not extend the discovery deadlines. This
Court should therefore determine that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Creekside's request to extend discovery because Creekside had unduly delayed this
matter.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT AWARDED PIONEER
ROOFING, AS THE PREVAILING PARTY, ITS
ATTORNEY FEES

Creekside argues that it was the prevailing party in this matter. Pioneer Roofing,
however, sued Creekside for $25,906.00, plus a 10% penalty, and interest, [R. 1-10], and
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the Jury awarded Creekside $31,865.00. [R. 610] Pioneer Roofing therefore prevailed in
this matter. This Court reviews "the trial court's determination as to who was the
prevailing party under an abuse of discretion standard." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002
UT 11,U25, 40 P.3d 1119.
In this case, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Creekside
attorney's fees as the prevailing party. The Trial Court determined as follows:

Plaintiffs counsel, Rick L. Sorens[e]n, has submitted
his Affidavit detailing the attorney's fees and costs that the
plaintiff incurred, totaling $20,329.00. In its Response, the
defendant raises a number of alternative arguments for
reducing these fees, eliminating them altogether or for
awarding the defendant its attorney's fees and costs. With
respect to the latter two arguments, the defendant essentially
contends that the jury's verdict was "factually and legally
invalid" and that it should be considered the prevailing party.
The Court has considered the defendant's theory that it
is the prevailing party and finds it unpersuasive. Under the
case law recited in the defendant's brief, it is undoubtable that
the plaintiff prevailed on the significant issues in this
litigation and that the defendant's success (both in terms of
monetary recovery and legal issues presented) was nominal.
Further, unless and until it is proven that the jury's verdict
was improper, this argument cannot provide a valid basis for
reassigning prevailing party status. Therefore the Court
remains unconvinced that the defendant rather than plaintiff,
can be considered the prevailing party.
[R. 723-24] (emphasis added). Creekside relies on R.T. Nielson Co. to support its theory
that it is the prevailing party. R.T. Nielson Co., however, supports the Trial Court's
determination that Pioneer Roofing is the prevailing party. In R. T. Nielson Co., the Utah
Supreme Court determined as follows:
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Which party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question
for the trial court. This question depends, to a large measure,
on the context of each case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to
leave this determination to the sound discretion of the trial
court.
R.T. Nielson Co., 2002 UT 11, at ^[25. "[T]he trial court is in a better position than we are
as an appellate court to decide which party is the prevailing party. In most cases
involving language similar to the contractual language before us here, there can generally
be only one prevailing party." Id. The supreme court also articulated a standard to
"permit a case-by-case evaluation by the trial court, and flexibility to handle
circumstances where both, or neither, parties may be considered to have prevailed." Id.
In this case, the Trial Court determined that "it is undoubtable that the plaintiff prevailed
on the significant issues in this litigation and that the defendant's success (both in terms
of monetary recovery and legal issues presented) was nominal." [R. 723] Creekside's
claim that it prevailed in this matter is therefore without merit. This Court should
therefore determine that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
Pioneer Roofing is the prevailing party.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT
PIONEER ROOFING'S ATTORNEY FEES
WERE REASONABLE AND NOT EXCESSIVE

Creekside also argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion when it determined
that Pioneer Roofing's attorney fees were reasonable and not excessive. The Utah
Supreme Court has determined as follows:
While the award of attorney fees must be supported by
evidence in the record, the trial court has discretion in
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determining the question of a fee's "reasonableness," as this
issue must be decided against a variety of factual
backgrounds. A trial court's discretion in determining the
amount of a reasonable attorney fee "arises from the fact that
it is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the
quality and efficiency of the representation and the
complexity of the litigation." Thus, as noted above, in the
absence of an abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb
the trial court's findings.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted).
The Trial Court determined as follows:
[T]he Court considers the defendant's argument that even if
the plaintiff is entitled to recover its attorney fees, the amount
sought is unreasonable and excessive. Specifically, the
defendant assails a number of entries in counsel's Affidavit as
being duplicitous, unnecessary and excessive in terms of time
and effort. Having reviewed these specific entries, the court
concludes that the defendant's objections are without merit
and that a reduction in the fees is unwarranted. In fact, a
number of the defendant's objections are based on the invalid
argument that simply because a particular motion or legal
endeavor pursued by the plaintiff was eventually
unsuccessful, there should be no recovery for the time
attributable thereto. However, it is the overall outcome that is
determinative of prevailing party status and attorney fee
recovery and not the success of each individual motion or
legal effort. Further, the Court is unpersuaded that Mr.
Sorensen's hourly fees should be reduced because of his
minimal involvement with jury trials involving construction
law. Mr. Sorensen's hourly fees are reasonable given his
apparent expertise in construction law and the comparable
fees charged by attorneys with similar practices and years of
experience. Overall, the Court concludes that the attorney's
fees and costs sought by the plaintiff are reasonable and
therefore declines to reduce the amounts sought by the almost
50% amount suggested by the defendant.
[R. 724-25] Thus, the Trial Court clearly provided in the record grounds for awarding
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Pioneer Roofing the attorney fees.
Creekside asserts that it "prevailed on its claims for Breach of Contract, Negligent
Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of Privacy, Trespass and Conversion .. .[and
therefore] the causes of action for Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of
Privacy, Trespass and Conversion do not allow a party an award for attorney's fees in
defending them or prosecuting them and no attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiff
for its unsuccessful defense of these claims." Brief of the Appellant, p. 29 (emphasis
omitted). Creekside fails to cite anywhere in the record where it shows that Creekside
was the prevailing party on its counterclaims. The Jury submitted a General Verdict to
the Trial Court finding "in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff and assess the
defendant's damages at $4,200.00." [R. 611] The Jury did not state whether it awarded
the damages for any of the torts claimed by Creekside, nor did the Jury state whether it
awarded the damages as an offset for damages pursuant to the contract. Consequently,
there is no evidence in the record that Creekside prevailed on any of its claims.
Furthermore, this Court has determined that where claims and counterclaims are
sufficiently tied to the enforcement of the contract, attorney fees should be awarded to the
prevailing party. See First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486-87 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996). In this case, the breach of contract claims were sufficiently tied to award the
prevailing party status to Pioneer Roofing.
To prevail on a claim that the Trial Court abused its discretion when awarding
attorney fees, Creekside "must 'marshal the evidence in support of the [trial court's]

if*

findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them
clearly erroneous."' Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28,1J38, 94 P.3d 193
(quoting Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, P 15, 979 P.2d 338). Creekside failed to marshal
any evidence in support of the Trial Court's findings. Creekside merely opines as to
reasons why it disagrees with the Court's findings and even fails to cite to the record
when setting forth its opinions.
For example, Creekside opined that the time billed by Pioneer Roofing's counsel
for drafting the Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim was excessive. [R. 648] This case
is complicated by the fact that a homeowners association is involved and Pioneer Roofing
needed to determine if the individual homeowner's would be liable. Creekside's
Counterclaim asserted many causes of action, each which needed to be researched before
filing a response. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the following:
By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the
court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, (1) it is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment
of new law; (3) the allegations and other factual contentions
have evidentiary support.
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 11(b). Before filing the Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim, Pioneer
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Roofing researched the law relevant to those causes of action. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure requires a party to assert all affirmative defenses when filing a
responsive pleading. Clearly the time to research those issues is before filing the
pleading. Pioneer Roofing presented that argument to the Trial Court before the Trial
Court made its attorney fee award. [R. 715-16]
Creekside also claims that Pioneer Roofing should not be able to bill for time spent
on defending Creekside's motions to recuse Judge Lindberg. Creekside even goes so far
as to claim that Pioneer Roofing "unsuccessfully" challenged Creekside's motion to
recuse. The Trial Court, through its associate presiding judge, determined that Creekside
had failed on every aspect of its motion to recuse. [R. 79-81] It is clear that Creekside
did not even review the rules of civil procedure before filing its motion. Had Creekside
actually read the rules, it should have determined that it was too late to file a motion for
recusal and neither party would have incurred attorney fees over that issue. Creekside,
however, filed the motion and clearly Pioneer Roofing had to respond. Notwithstanding,
Creekside filed another motion to recuse. Instead of expending attorney fees to fight the
second motion, Pioneer Roofing requested a status conference from the Trial Court to
determine if Pioneer Roofing should respond to Creekside's untimely motions. [R. 29798] Consequently, Pioneer Roofing saved the parties from expending more on attorney
fees.
Creekside opines that this matter has been adversarial, but the blame for this matter
being adversarial rests on Creekside. To cite one example, the parties had briefed Pioneer
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Roofing's Motion to Strike and for Protective Order. Instead of waiting for the Court to
rule on the motions, Creekside's counsel telephoned Pioneer Roofings counsel and began
shouting so loud that Pioneer Roofing's counsel had to hold telephone receiver one foot
from his ear. [R. 152-57] Pioneer Roofing's attorney terminated the conversation
because of Creekside's counsel's unprofessional behavior. [R. 155] Creekside later
complained that Pioneer Roofing's attorney would not respond to his inquiry and simply
terminated the conversation. [R. 145-48]
Creekside asserts that "the Trial Court should have taken into consideration the
'inefficient' and improper actions by Plaintiff that increased the fees and the uncertainty
of the litigation," because "Plaintiff finally conceded at trial that he had damaged
Defendant's air cooling units." Brief of the Appellant, p. 36. Creekside fails to cite to
the record to show when Pioneer Roofing made any such concession. Even if Creekside
was able to substantiate such a claim, Creekside failed to show how such a concession
damaged it.
Creekside also complains that the Trial Court failed to consider how invoices
provided at trial increased the costs of litigation. Brief of the Appellant, p. 36. Pioneer
Roofing did not have the invoices because Pioneer Roofing does not keep invoices after
the product is delivered to a job site. [R. 714] At trial, plaintiff John Stout testified that
he had purchased the products from a supplier and after Mr. Stout testified Mr. Sorensen
asked Mr. Stout if the supplier might still have the invoices. [R. 714] After trial that day
Mr. Stout called the supplier and had the invoices faxed to him. [R. 714] Creekside was
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given the copies the next day. [R. 714] Obviously Creekside could have obtained the
invoices through discovery by subpoenaing the invoices directly from the supplier but
failed to do so. See Pack 2001 UT App at f32 ("[T]he trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it refused to compel Pack to produce the blueprints for the house because
Case could have obtained the blueprints from Salt Lake City.") Furthermore, the invoices
were for the products that Pioneer Roofing actually installed on the project. [R. 714] In
other words, there was no surprise and Creekside never sought to enter them into the
record nor did Creekside object at trial to the timeliness of the production. As a
consequence, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it did not discount Pioneer
Roofing's attorney fees relating to the "concession" and invoices. This Court should
therefore determine that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
that Pioneer Roofing's attorney fees were reasonable and not excessive.
V.

THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND TO THE
TRIAL COURT FOR A DETERMINATION OF
THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES PIONEER
ROOFING SHOULD BE AWARDED ON
APPEAL

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion with regard to any claim brought by
Creekside on appeal. As a result, this Court should determine that Pioneer Roofing is the
prevailing party on appeal and is therefore entitled to an award of its attorney fees on appeal.
See R.T. Nielson Co., 2002 UT 11, ^11 ("As the prevailing party, RTNC is entitled to
recover attorney fees incurred on appeal based on the parties' agreement.") This Court
should therefore remand to the Trial Court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney
fees incurred by Pioneer Roofing on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Trial Court's rulings because the Trial Court did not
abuse its discretion when ruling on the appeal issues. The Trial Court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Creekside's motion to compel because the Trial Court determined
that Creekside's discovery requests were vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. The Trial Court
did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Creekside had unduly delayed this matter
and therefore denied Creekside's request to extend discovery deadlines. The Trial Court did
not abuse its discretion when it determined that Pioneer Roofing was the prevailing party
because the Jury awarded Pioneer Roofing the contract amount and Creekside was awarded a
nominal amount on its counterclaims. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that Pioneer Roofing's attorney fees were reasonable and not excessive.
Creekside failed to marshal the evidence in favor of the Trial Court with regard to the
attorney fee findings. Finally, because Pioneer Roofing is the prevailing party, this matter
should be remanded to the Trial Court for a determination of attorney fees in favor of Pioneer
Roofing for this appeal. Thus, this Court should affirm the Trial Court in all aspects of this
appeal and remand for attorney fee determination.
ORAL ARGUMENT STATEMENT
Oral argument is requested.
DATED thisj^Bay of February, 2004.
HAWKINS & SORENSEN, LC
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Rick Sorensen
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